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There is a debate about whether advisory non-binding sentencing guidelines affect the sentences outcomes
of individuals convicted in jurisdictions with this sentencing framework. Identifying the impact of
sentencing guidelines is a difficult empirical problem because court actors may have preferences for
sentencing severity that are correlated with the preferences that are outlined in the guidelines. But,
in Maryland, ten percent of the recommended sentences computed in the guideline worksheets contain
calculation errors. We use this unique source of quasi-experimental variation to quantify the extent
to which sentencing guidelines influence policy outcomes.  Among drug offenses, we find that the
direct impact of the guidelines is roughly ½ the size of the overall correlation between recommendations
and outcomes.  For violent offenses, we find the same ½ discount for sentence recommendations that
are higher than they should have been, but more responsiveness to recommendations that are too low.
  We find no evidence that the guidelines themselves directly affect discretion for property offenders,
perhaps because judges generally have substantial experience with property cases and therefore do
not rely on the errant information.  Sentences are more sensitive to both accurate and inaccurate recommendations
for crimes that occur less frequently and have more complicated sentencing.  This suggests that when
the court has more experience, the recommendations have less influence.  More tentative findings
suggest that, further down the decision chain, parole boards counteract the remaining influence of
the guidelines.
Shawn D. Bushway
School of Criminal Justice
University at Albany, SUNY
135 Western Avenue










Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey
New Jersey Hall
75 Hamilton Street




Forty years ago in the United States, almost all state criminal justice systems used indeterminate 
sentencing.  Judges assigned sentences with large ranges and allowed parole boards to determine 
the actual sentence.  This structure was largely created to facilitate rehabilitation and to ensure 
that each punishment was proportional to the severity of each particular crime.  Starting in the 
1970’s, however, scholars and practitioners raised questions about the wide disparity in 
sentences such a system created (Frankel 1973, von Hirsch 1976).  At about the same time, 
others were questioning the validity of the rehabilitation model (Martinson 1974) and calling for 
more definitive sentences for the purposes of deterrence (Wilson 1975).  These critiques led to a 
wave of sentencing reforms, including the imposition of sentencing guidelines, determinate 
sentences, and mandatory sentences, through which legislatures attempted to exert control over 
punishment decision by imposing structure on judicial discretion.  As of 2008, twenty-four states 
use some type of judicial guidelines in the criminal sentencing process.
1  
 
Throughout this period of reform, researchers have questioned the ability of legislatures to 
fundamentally affect sentencing outcomes.  With few exceptions, sentencing reforms have 
focused on limiting judicial discretion while ignoring decisions made by other actors in the 
justice system, including prosecutors, defense attorneys, and parole boards (Tonry 1996).   
 
There are competing theoretical models of the extent to which legislative actions are 
implemented or undone by judges, attorneys, and parole boards.  Reitz (1998) formally presents 
a model in which – across the institutional forms of structured discretion existing in the U.S. – 
these actors can largely counteract legislative mandates regarding sentencing.  Huber and 
Gordon (2007) and Jacobi and Tiller (2007) build models in which lower court judges 
strategically respond to restrictions placed upon them by the legislature. In contrast to these 
theories, many legal models are predicated on greater compliance with rules from higher (earlier) 
levels of government, either from a positive or a normative perspective (Schauer 1991, Sullivan 
1992). Such models of legal directives predict compliance except, perhaps, when the directives 
take on extreme values.  Several types of social norms would also predict compliance.  If the 
sentencing recommendations produced by the legislature embody widely held social norms 
regarding punishment, then later actors may well comply with these even when they differ from 
the actor’s own preferences.  
 
The extent to which rules set by the legislature bind or influence decisions regarding sentence 
length is central to institutional design and to determining the practical impact of any proposed 
reform regarding criminal punishment.  For example, it has been suggested that prosecutors gain 
more power relative to judges under sentencing guidelines and that this leads to sentences that 
are overly punitive (Alschuler 1978, Coffee and Tonry 1983, Piehl and Bushway 2007).  This 
concern will be valid only if sentencing guidelines cause judges and other actors to deviate from 
their preferred level of punishment.  It is true that both legislative recommendations and actual 
sentences have increased over time.  What is unclear is whether this is due to sentencing 
recommendations affecting the behavior of judges or correlated changes in institutional 
preferences over time.  
                                                 
1  United States Sentencing Commission 2008 Annual Report: http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2008/chap1_08.pdf.  
For more on variation in sentencing structures, see Pfaff (2006).   2
  
An extensive literature evaluates the impact of the adoption of structured sentencing.
2  But there 
is mixed evidence on the operation of discretion within structured sentencing regimes.  
Consistent with the theoretical predictions of strategic response, research on mandatory 
minimums has shown that they are enforced selectively, if at all (Farrell 2003, Ulmer et al. 
2007).  Schanzenbach and Tiller (2008) present evidence that judges manipulate charges if the 
cost of deviating from the federal guidelines is relatively high.  On the other hand, Kessler and 
Piehl (1998) found that policy changes in the early 1980s which enhanced recommended 
punishments did raise sentence lengths for affected crimes, suggesting some limits to available 
judicial discretion. 
 
The impact of guidelines on subsequent criminal justice decisions is of particular interest after 
Kimbrough v. United States and United States v. Booker.  While sentencing guidelines no longer 
limit the decisions judges can make, even recommended sentences provide information to judges 
about what a “typical” punishment might look like.  Experimental evidence on the role of 
information in legal decision making shows that the context can affect outcomes.  Rachlinski and 
Jourden (2003) find strong evidence that hypothetical jurors are sensitive to “contrast effects.” 
When subjects are asked to decide on both severe and minor criminal cases at the same time, as 
opposed to one case at a time, the result is lower punishments for the worse offender and higher 
punishments for the less serious offender.  Judges are not immune to the influence of irrelevant 
information.  In a sample of active judges, Wistrich et al. (2004) demonstrated that exposure to 
legally inadmissible information about either the defendant or the victim had a statistically and 
substantively meaningful effect on judicial decision making. 
 
Estimating the impact of legislative action on sentencing decisions in real data is complicated by 
the (potentially) simultaneous determination of preferences and legislation.
3  Measures of 
judicial and legislative tastes for punishment are rarely comparable (Bailey and Chang 2001), 
and are unlikely to be constant over time (Martin and Quinn 2007).  However, to the extent that 
legislators and judges are exposed to the same stimuli, legislative changes in recommended 
punishments may be positively correlated with judicial taste (Schoenfeld 2010). For example, 
consider the following series of events.  Increased public concern about violence associated with 
crack cocaine leads legislatures to increase recommended sentences for crack possession.  At the 
same time, judges observe the increased number of defendants facing crack-related charges and 
decide that harsher punishments are in order.  Parole boards follow suit, and extend periods of 
incarceration yet further.  In this case, simply comparing changes in sentences and time served 
with sentence recommendations will reveal a positive correlation, but it would not have been 
induced by legislative action.  
 
The ideal test of the influence of guidelines themselves would be to hold constant judicial 
preferences over punishment, and observe whether sentences change when legislatively 
determined recommendations are random. In lieu of randomized sentence recommendations, we 
identify instances in the Maryland circuit court in which the case facts are not consistent with the 
                                                 
2  For a literature review and a reporting of apparent reductions in disparity after the adoption of both voluntary and 
mandatory guidelines, see Pfaff (2006). 
3  Comparing sentences before and after the implementation of a guidelines system is also problematic, as even the 
type of sentencing data collected fundamentally changes with the reform (Mustard 2001).   3
final sentence recommendation.  As documented later, these inconsistencies appear to be the 
result of human error, exogenous to the preferences of downstream actors.  Inaccurate guideline 
calculations result in downstream actors receiving sentencing recommendations that were 
arbitrarily longer or shorter than the typical (appropriate) recommendation for the conviction in 
question.  Although we never observe the preferences of any of the actors in the system, 
conditional on observed facts of the case, these errors will be uncorrelated with preferences.  
This source of variation, then, introduces random variation in the recommendations affecting 
sentencing outcomes, allowing us to disentangle the direct influence of the guidelines themselves 
from shared preferences toward criminal punishment.
4  
 
We find that, on average, preferences for punishment are positively correlated across the stages 
of the criminal justice system.  On average, each month recommended by the state guidelines is 
associated with a 12-20 day sentence and approximately 5 days of prison time served, depending 
on the type of offense.  The message here is mixed.  Sentencing guidelines are strongly and 
positively correlated with the final outcomes, but the downstream actors clearly have a lot of 
discretion to deviate from the recommendations.  It is at least possible that the guidelines 
themselves are irrelevant to the final outcomes in the system.   
 
We attempt to shed light on this question by examining the effect of random variation in 
sentencing recommendations.  In drug cases, the direct impact of guidelines is roughly ½ the size 
of the overall correlation between sentencing recommendations and outcomes: each month 
recommended by the guidelines is associated with a 12 day sentence, but each erroneously added 
(or subtracted) month increases (or reduces) sentences by 6 days.   Arbitrarily longer 
recommendations are also discounted by ½ for violent offenses, but sentences are more 
responsive to recommendations that shorten sentences arbitrarily.  For property offenses, we do 
not find evidence that the guidelines themselves directly influence judicial decision making.  We 
conclude that the recommendations have limited impact when the court has sufficient experience 
with the type of case.   
 
Maryland’s guidelines are voluntary and the recommended sentencing ranges are wide.  In this 
institutional setting characterized by substantial discretion of downstream actors, some may be 
surprised that these voluntary guidelines alter sentencing outcomes at all.  For those whose prior 
is that public servants comply with directives, the surprise will be the extent of noncompliance.  
Either way, the impacts are substantial.  A typical error that is “too low” has a recommendation 
that is off by 18 months, which implies an average sentence reduction of nearly 8 months.  
Positive errors tend to be larger, but the impact on outcomes is smaller.  A typical error of 27 
months extra in the recommendation translates into a 4-month longer imposed sentence.  In more 
tentative results, we find that parole boards operate in the opposite direction, reducing the impact 
of the errant recommendations on eventual time served in prison. 
 
Recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions have restored substantial discretion to judges in many 
jurisdictions, including the federal system, which were previously operating under deterministic 
guidelines.  These results predict that a move from mandatory to voluntary guidelines will mean 
                                                 
4  Note that we are examining the impact of the guidelines on judges and parole boards.  It is outside of the scope of 
this paper to measure the impact of the sentencing decision on the parole board’s final decision.    4




The Maryland sentencing guidelines have always been advisory.  That is, judges are not required 
to assign a sentence within the upper and lower bounds and parole boards are not compelled to 
ensure that the time served falls within the guidelines.  In fact, there are few direct incentives for 
judges to respond to changing legislative preferences that are reflected in changing 
recommended sentences.  Consistent with this, as well as with the predictions of Reitz (1998), 
Huber and Gordon (2007) and Jacobi and Tiller (2007), sentences fall within the guideline range 
less than half the time.  Some states require judges to file statements justifying their decision to 
sentence outside the recommended range, and in some jurisdictions these statements receive 
court scrutiny.  Under Maryland law, neither of these checks occur.   
 
The Maryland Sentencing Guidelines consist of three matrices, one for drug offenses, one for 
violent offenses, and one for offenses against property.  The rows of these matrices correspond to 
an “Offense Score” (reflecting attributes of the instant offense) and the columns to an “Offender 
Score” (reflecting criminal history and other offender attributes).  These matrices specify the 
recommended upper and lower bounds for the sentence.
5  These guidelines are implemented by 
(roughly) four sets of actors: the Maryland State Commission on Criminal Sentencing Policy, 
practicing attorneys, judges, and parole boards. 
 
The matrices are produced by the Maryland State Commission on Criminal Sentencing Policy 
(MSCCSP), a sentencing commission permanently established by the legislature in 1999 
following several years in an advisory capacity.  Sixteen of the 19 voting members are appointed 
to four year terms by either the governor (nine members), the chief judge of the court of appeals 
(three members), the President of the Senate (two members) or the Speaker of the House (two 
members).  The Attorney General, the State Public Defender, and the Secretary of the 
Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services are also voting members.
6  The MSCCSP 
also provides worksheets to assist in the calculation of these sentence recommendations.  In 
Figure 1, we present the 2001 version of the Maryland Sentencing Guidelines Worksheet, which 
was the relevant version during the time period of our analysis.   
 
Typically, guidelines worksheets are prepared by both the state’s attorney and the defense 
attorney, and it is commonly understood that the worksheets form the basis of the pre-trial 
bargaining process between the two attorneys.  Completing a worksheet involves a number of 
steps.  First, the offense in question must be located in the Maryland criminal statute.  The statute 
lists the offense “seriousness category,” which ranges from I (the most serious) to VII (the least 
serious).  For drug or property offenses, the seriousness category is equivalent to the offense 
score. For violent offenses, the seriousness category is converted into “seriousness points.”  As 
evident in figure 1, additional seriousness points may be added based on the nature of the crime.  
To further complicate the procedure, note that the point values are highest for the lowest 
                                                 
5  Copies of the sentencing guidelines are available at http://www.msccsp.org/guidelines/matrices.html. 
6  We think of this collective body as representing the legislature and for brevity sometimes refer to it as such.   5
seriousness category.  For violent offenses only, the sum of all of these points is the relevant 
offense score.  The next step in completing the worksheet is to calculate an offender score, which 
is the sum of four elements reflecting the juvenile and adult criminal history of the defendant.  
 
Once an offense and offender score have been calculated, the individual completing the 
worksheet must locate the range of recommended sentences which corresponds to those scores.  
In the case of violent offenses, there are 120 cells from which to choose.  The property crime 
matrix has 48 different cells, and the drug matrix has 56.  After locating the correct cell, the 
upper and lower bounds of the range of recommended sentences are entered on the worksheet.  
After conviction, one final worksheet is submitted to the sentencing judge.  Regardless of who 
completes the final form, both the defense attorney and the prosecutor are expected to agree to its 
terms.  
 
Maryland circuit court judges, who are initially appointed by the governor then subject to non 
partisan elections every 15 years, are expected to observe the range of recommended sentences 
and issue a decision, which they record on the worksheet.  The judge then signs the now 
complete worksheet, copies of which are then distributed to various parties.  One copy is retained 
by the sentencing judge, one copy becomes part of the offender’s criminal file which is available 
to the Maryland Parole Commission, one copy is sent to the MSCCSP, 
and copies are given to both attorneys.
7 
   
III. Identifying and Characterizing Inaccuracies    
Through a research agreement, we obtained an extract from the MSCCSP database on 17,052 
sentences of males between the ages of 18 and 35 who were sentenced between July 2001 and 
2004 for a crime with a single criminal count.
8  The database contains all of the information 
entered on the guidelines worksheet (Figure 1), save the name of the sentencing judge.  We 
calculated the upper and lower bounds of the recommended sentences for each single count 
conviction based on a) the entered offender and offense scores, and b) the crime and criminal 
history elements underlying the offender and offense scores.  These computer-generated 
recommendations were then compared to what was entered on the worksheet.  If either of the 
calculated upper and lower bounds did not match the upper and lower bounds entered on the 
worksheet, this sentence was flagged as a potential error.  
 
After we identified the set of cases with potential errors, we employed two interns at the 
MSCCSP to locate original copies of every identified worksheet to double check the information.  
Some of the identified discrepancies were found to be the result of data entry errors by the 
interns at MSCCSP rather than mistakes in the completion of the worksheets. These cases were 
                                                 
7 These copies are produced via contact paper; each worksheet consists of six pieces of paper, and the defense 
attorneys’ copy is the last one.  In personal communication, one public defender noted that it is often difficult for 
him to read his copy of the final worksheet, limiting his ability to always catch and correct errors. (email 
communication with Louis Brendan Curran, Esq., Baltimore City – Felony Trial Division, office of the Public 
Defender, 10/26/2009)  
8  The calculation of sentence recommendations for multiple charge convictions depends on whether the different 
offenses are considered part of the same criminal act, which is not consistently recorded in the data.  We exclude 
these observations from our analysis.   6
not considered errors for the purpose of our analysis, as the inaccuracy was introduced after the 
sentence was determined.
9  Using this universe of verified errors, we then provided a randomly 
generated list of 100 of these cases to the Executive Director of the MSCCSP, Dr. David Soulé, 
who performed his own review to determine whether these cases were truly errors.  He agreed 
with our classification in all but 11 cases.
10  We used his feedback to further refine our criteria 
for identification of errors.
11 
 
A Baltimore public defender that we spoke to recalled personally noticing “about one 
[incorrectly completed worksheet] a year.”
12  We found an overall inaccuracy rate between 2001 
and 2004 of 10%.  Errors occur across the range of the guidelines matrices.  Variation in the 
recommended sentence on the worksheet is substantial in both accurate and inaccurate cases, as 
noted in the large standard deviations.  There are more high errors than low errors for drug 
offenses; the opposite is true for property and violent offenses.   
 
Relative to empirical evidence on learning and accuracy rates in both the criminal justice and 
private spheres, we believe an accuracy rate of 90% reflects a relatively successful production 
process.  For example, Contreras, Kim, and Tristao (2007) find that 8.2% of LASIK patients 
require a second surgery, and Liebman et al. (2000) point out that 41% of capital convictions 
between 1973 and 1975 were thrown out due to “serious error” in the original conviction.  Cole, 
Cornyn and Gunther (1995) found that the ratings system developed by the Federal Reserve 
miscategorized 17% of failing banks as satisfactory, and 7% of satisfactory banks as failing.  
This was considered an improvement over the previous rating system.   
 
In the set of verified mistakes, 45% of the errors were what we call low errors—where the 
recommendation from the worksheet (the midpoint of the range) was lower than it should have 
been if the worksheet had been filled out accurately.  The remaining 55% of the errors were high 
errors, where the recommendation from the worksheet was higher than it should have been.   
 
There were three primary sources of mistakes on the worksheet.  Mistakes were most likely to 
occur when the person completing the worksheet had to reference other documents.  In 1,588 
instances, the upper and lower bound of the recommended sentence entered on the worksheet 
were incorrectly copied from the sentencing guidelines matrix.  An additional 100 errors where 
made due to incorrectly copying the wrong seriousness score from the Maryland criminal 
statutes.  Finally, on 26 occasions, the elements of the offender and offense score were summed 
incorrectly. 
                                                 
9  This article only attempts to deal with inconsistencies within the sentencing worksheet itself, taking as given any 
possible inaccuracies underlying these data.  
10  In addition, there were 20 cases for which it was impossible to ascertain whether or not the worksheet was 
correctly completed, as the cases involved subsequent offenses and the correct allocation of case factors was 
unclear. 
11  We are confident that this process has identified cases of error according to the rules promulgated by the 
MSCCSP.  Independent of our project, the MSCCSP has been working to implement an automated worksheet.  This 
project has as one of its explicit goals the elimination of data entry and worksheet compilation errors (Maryland 
State Commission on Criminal Sentencing Policy 2005). 
12 Email communication with Louis Brendan Curran, Esq., Baltimore City – Felony Trial Division, office of the 
Public Defender, 10/26/2009.    7
 
Using the mean of the upper and lower guidelines recommendations as a summary measure of 
the sentence recommendation, the errors we identified are reasonably large in magnitude.  The 
average correct recommendation was 45 months, downward errors were an average of 17.6 
months (sd= 22.2) too low and upward errors were 27.4 months (sd=35.2) too high.  The 
distribution of errors is predictably skewed; the median low error is 10.7 months, and the median 
high error is 12 months (the median correct recommendation is 24 months). 
 
Did these human errors affect judicial sentences?  We begin with graphical evidence.  Figure 2 
displays the distributions of the difference between the midpoint of the recommendation entered 
on the worksheet and the sentence imposed.  When recommendations are accurate, the 
distribution is centered just below zero, and is bimodal.  When the recommendations contain 
errors, the distributions of sentences are single peaked but slightly shifted either to the left or 
right depending on the direction of the mistake.  Judges do appear to respond to the guidelines 
differently when the worksheet is not completed correctly.  Relative to the worksheet 
recommendation, sentences are higher when recommendations are too low and lower when 
recommendations are too high.  This is consistent with judges, or others, noticing the mistake, or 
generally ignoring the guidelines worksheet.      
 
The distribution of judicial deviation from the worksheet recommendation suggests that, to some 
extent, judges counteract mistakes.  However, it is not obvious that judges fully account for 
human error.  Figure 3 displays the distribution of deviations from the midpoint of the range of 
recommended sentences if the worksheets had been calculated correctly -- the “accurate” 
midpoint.  If judges identified the inaccuracies or ignored the worksheets as a general rule, then 
the relationship between the sentence and the accurate recommended sentence should be 
unrelated to whether or not the worksheet was correctly calculated.   
 
As in Figure 2, there is a large mass of sentences between 0 and 20 months lower than the 
accurate midpoint.  If the recommended sentences are too high, the distribution is shifted to the 
right, meaning that sentences tend to be higher relative to the accurate recommendation.  For 
worksheet recommendations that are lower than they should be, there are relatively more 
sentences just to the left of the mass point than to the right, indicating a downward shift in the 
distribution of sentences.  While deviations from inaccurate recommendations tend to 
compensate for the direction of the error, consistent with the experimental results of Rachlinski 
and Jourden (2003), they do not move enough to undo the error completely.     
 
It is possible that the sentences we observe, as well as the errors themselves, are due to some 
case-specific factor, like the race of the defendant, or whether or not the charge was pled out.  In 
order to evaluate this, we first look for any substantive differences in observed characteristics 
that are recorded on the guidelines worksheet before the judge issues a sentence.  These 
“upstream” characteristics are listed and defined in Table 1, and include demographics (age and 
race), whether the case was resolved by plea bargain and the type of legal representation, the job 
title of the person who completed the worksheet, and the sentence recommendation itself.  Table 
2 provides descriptive statistics separately for the accurate worksheets, those with high errors, 
and those with low errors.  
   8
Table 2 also reports the value of the guidelines recommendation that corresponds with the case 
characteristics, the accurate midpoint.  This can be thought of as a summary measure for the 
severity of the crime, using the severity weights of the sentencing commission.  Property 
offenses have shorter recommended sentences than the other crime types.  Among violent and 
property offenders, those cases with high errors have shorter accurate recommended sentences 
than consistent worksheets, which are in turn shorter than cases with low errors.  Violent 
offenses have the most complicated calculations, and this result suggests that the most 
complicated calculations (with the longest sentences) sometimes miss some of the enhancements 
that are relevant for this offense type.  Within drug offenses, cases with errors have shorter 
accurate recommended sentences than those with consistent worksheets.  Because of the cross 
offense differences, we estimate separate models below. 
 
Cases with errors were more likely to be resolved with a plea bargain than cases without errors.  
This difference in the rate of plea bargaining is statistically significant for all offense types when 
the recommended sentence was too high – almost 80% of these cases are resolved by plea 
bargain, compared with 70% of all consistent cases.  One possible interpretation is that 
defendants were pressured to plea by the threat of the high sentence recommendation.  At the 
same time, defendants who received a recommendation that was too low were also more likely to 
plea (71.7% vs. 70.5%).  Both of these observations are consistent with the belief that 
worksheets of cases settled by plea receiving less scrutiny than others.  We discuss this and other 
interpretations of this finding below.  The nature of the representation does not vary with the 
accuracy of the worksheet.  The same is true for the age of the offender.  It appears that 
unconditionally, black offenders are more likely to receive high errors in violent or property 
cases.  
 
In order to formally determine if there is some systematic pattern in the occurrence of errors, we 
estimated a logit model in which the left hand side variable takes on the value of one when the 
guidelines worksheet contains an error, either too high or too low.
13  We include on the right 
hand side dummy variables indicating whether or not a plea bargain was reached, the jurisdiction 
of sentence, six month fixed effects, the job title of the individual completing the worksheet, 
whether or not the defendant had private representation, and the age and race of the offender.  
We also control for the previous number of “similar” convictions occurring in that jurisdiction in 
that year, where “similar” is defined as a violation of the same criminal statute (e.g., “second 
degree assault”).
14  We interpret this as a proxy for learning or familiarity – the more common 
the offense is, the higher the probability that the individual completing the worksheet has 
calculated the correct recommendation before.  
 
Marginal effects from logit models are presented in Table 3, by offense type.  We find little 
relationship between the seriousness of the offense, captured in the accurate midpoint, and the 
probability of an error.  The higher error rates for plea bargains seen in Table 2 do not carry 
                                                 
13  The use of logits in a model with so many dummy variables means that there is a substantial number of 
observations dropped due to perfect collinearity.  This can be seen by comparing the error rate in the logit estimation 
sample to the error rate in the full sample.  In earlier versions of the paper we estimated the same specifications 
using a linear probability models, which allowed us to include extensive controls without inducing sample selection.  
The estimates are generally robust to alternative modeling specifications (OLS, probit or logit models).  
14  Convictions in which the guidelines are incorrectly calculated are excluded in the construction of this measure.   9
through here; controlling for other observed features of the case, there is no statistically 
significant effect on the probability of an error from having a case settled by plea.  There is no 
statistically significant relationship between type of representation and the error probability.  
  
We find strong evidence that individuals convicted of relatively common offenses are 
substantially less likely to have an error in their sentence recommendations, supporting our 
learning hypothesis.  This is particularly true for drug offenses, where a10% increase in the 
number of times a similar case has been resolved in that jurisdiction in that year decreases the 
overall probability of an error by 2.5%.  There is an average of 297 similar cases for drug 
offenses, compared to 13 for violent cases and 10 for property cases.  The hypothesis that the 
individual charged with completing the final worksheet learns how to complete it correctly with 
practice is an intuitive one.  
 
Among drug offenses, we find corroborating evidence for this learning hypothesis from 
examining the job title of the person who completed the final worksheet.  Parole and probation 
agents, the omitted group, and states’ attorneys together complete over 90% of all worksheets, 
and these two groups are equally likely to commit an error- notice the large standard error on the 
state’s attorney dummy in column 1.  Public defenders, who complete only 21% of worksheets, 
and private attorneys, who complete only 2.3%, are significantly more likely to commit a 
mistake.  Because we are controlling for the representation of the offender, this effect is not 
picking up differences in the quality of legal counsel, which itself may be correlated with the 




Inaccurate worksheet calculations that increase a recommended sentence may differ in important 
ways from inaccurate calculations that reduce the recommendation, as the incentives for 
uncovering the error differ depending upon its direction.  Andreoni (1991)’s model of the 
judicial system predicts such asymmetry.  In this model, which he calls the “reasonable doubt 
test,” the asymmetry arises because juror or judicial demands on the evidence increase as 
penalties increase.  
 
To allow for asymmetry we separately examine high and low errors in columns (4) through (9) 
of Table 3.  Across offense types, more serious offenses (those with longer accurate sentence 
recommendations) are associated with fewer high errors and more low errors.  Consistent with 
Andreoni (1991), the relationship between the number of drug cases seen in the jurisdiction and 
the error rate is negative and statistically significant for errors in both directions, but the 
magnitude is smaller for the low errors.  We observe an asymmetric relationship between plea 
bargains and errors for drug offenses – plea bargains are strongly associated with worksheet 
recommendations that are “too high.”  We come back to the interpretation of this correlation 
below. 
 
                                                 
15  There is no discretion intended with regard to the worksheet itself.  All case facts are expected to be reported.  
Evidence that the facts are recorded on the worksheet comes from Farrell (2003), who studied the extent to which 
those who used a firearm in the crime, as represented on the sentencing worksheet, received mandatory sentence 
enhancements.  She found that 70% of cases with firearms as a “case fact” did not receive a sentence enhancement.    10
Relative to parole and probation agents, states’ attorneys appear more likely to calculate a 
recommended sentence that is too low, only for drug offenses.  While there is not much precision 
in the estimates for state’s attorney, the signs of the coefficients are inconsistent with a 
prosecutor trying to increase the amount of punishment an offender receives.  Public defenders 
and private attorneys are more likely to commit both high and low errors, which is again 
consistent with our hypothesis that these are true errors that are less likely to occur as individuals 
learn how to use the guidelines worksheets.  People convicted of violent offenses are about one 
percentage point (roughly 26%) less likely to have a worksheet recommendation that is lower 
than it should be.  
  
Based on this analysis, we conclude the observed errors are not correlated with another factor 
that may affect plea negotiations or a judge’s or parole board’s decisions.
16  We do find that the 
more frequently a particular offense was encountered, the less likely there was to be an error. 
Therefore, we conclude that inconsistent guidelines recommendations were the result of simple 
human error.  This type of human error should be uncorrelated with preferences for punishment.  
In the remainder of the paper, we exploit the difference between the observed recommendation 
and what it should have been to determine the independent effect of guidelines on sentencing and 




To investigate how guidelines recommendations impact the length of criminal sentences 
imposed, we decompose the recommended sentence into three parts:  the accurate 
recommendation (that should have been recommended based on the case facts and the 
guidelines), the months erroneously recommended in addition to the accurate recommendation, 
and the months erroneously excluded.  For any observation, one or both of the latter components 
will be zero. 
 
We model the impact of the recommended sentence on the outcome as: 
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where Sentencei is the sentence (in days) passed down after conviction i, AMi is the accurate 
recommended sentence (in months), modeled as the midpoint of the lower and upper ends of the 
recommended range, and WMi is the recommended sentence as entered on the guidelines 
worksheet, again represented by the range’s midpoint (in months).  The dummy variable DH 
takes on the value of one if the quantity (WMi - AMi) is larger than zero, indicating that the 
recommended sentence given to the judge was higher than it should have been based on the 
information provided on the worksheet.  Similarly, DL equals one if the recommended sentence 
is too low, meaning that (WMi - AMi) is negative.  The matrix Xi controls for observed 
                                                 
16  Another way to test the independence of the errors is to calculate an omnibus F-test of the differences between 
those with errors in their recommendations and those without.  We implemented this by running a seemingly 
unrelated regression of a system of sentences recommendations (standardized by age and accurate midpoint) stacked 
with race, representation, plea, and offense type and run against the error dummy along with the number of similar 
offenses, jurisdiction and time dummies.  The p-value on the test of significance of the error dummy is 0.22, 
consistent with conditional independence of the errors.   11
characteristics that might also affect the sentencing decision but are not contained in AMi, 
including the age of the offender at sentencing, whether or not the offender had private 
representation, whether or not the a plea bargain was reached, the jurisdiction and date of the 
conviction (in six month intervals), whether or not the offender is black, the job title of the 
person who completed the guidelines worksheet, and our measure of offense familiarity (the 





A   , and 
S
L   separately for each offense type.
17  
 
Assuming there is a general consensus between the judge and legislature on proportionality, we 
expect that  S
A  > 0.  If the final sentence is independent of the guidelines recommendation, either 
because the recommendation is not relied upon during sentencing or because the inaccurate 
calculations are corrected during the sentencing process, we should not be able to reject the null 




H   ; the additional or missing months in the recommendations would 
simply add noise to the equation.   
 
Such a finding would indicate that the guidelines themselves do not affect the sentences 
imposed, and any observed correlation between changes in the guidelines and sentence length is 
due to simultaneously determined preferences of the judge and legislature.  Alternatively, if 
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H   separately from 
S
L   allows a test of whether the effect of misinformation is 




H    .  
 
If observed “errors” are actually the result of strategic bargaining, we would overstate the 







H      .  For example, consider the possibility that the prosecuting and 
defense attorneys agree to allow the offender to be officially convicted of a lesser charge in 
exchange for a slightly longer sentence.  The alternate situation is also possible -- in which the 
offender pleads guilty to a particular charge in exchange for a shorter sentence -- although we 
have no reason to suppose that this occurs.  Because entering a plea is a predictor of having a 
recommended sentence that is too high (for drug offenses), but not too low, if there is such a bias 
we expect it is more likely to exist in our estimate of 
S
H   than our estimate of 
S
L  . 
 
V. Results 




A   ,  and
S
L  are presented in the first three rows of Table 4.  The first three 
columns report the main results by offense type; the last three restrict the sample to cases settled 
by plea.  In addition to controls for plea bargain and whether the defendant had private 
                                                 
17  Note that because we measure the dependant variable in days and the independent variables in months, see  S
H  , 
S
L  , and  S
A  , the coefficients are measured in “days per month.” 
18  Note that we do not expect  S
A   to be equal to one, since judges are observed to deviate from the recommended 
sentences with some frequency.  The question of interest is whether or not judges respond in the same way to the 
component of the recommendation that is uncorrelated with their preferences.    12
representation, all specifications include as correlates the jurisdiction, time, and demographic 
controls from the previous analyses.
19   
 
For each additional month of incarceration recommended by the sentencing guidelines in drug 
case, the average sentence length increases by 11.8 days. An incorrectly long or short sentence 
recommendation, however, appears to be discounted by roughly 50% relative to correct 
recommendations.  This suggests that a substantial amount of discretion remains under voluntary 
guidelines; judicial decisions are more highly correlated with the accurate part of the guidelines 
recommendation than the arbitrary part.  Roughly 60% of all convictions in Maryland are for 
drug offenses, and recall that the drug guidelines rely on only seriousness of the offense and 
length of criminal history to determine recommended sentencing ranges.  As a result, it is 
reasonable to assume that judges and attorneys are more familiar with the “typical” punishment 
in a drug case.  P-values for F-tests (reported at the bottom of the table) show that the data reject 
the null hypothesis that accurate and inaccurate sentence recommendations in either direction 
have the same impact on sentence length, but we fail to reject the null hypothesis that judges 
respond in a symmetric way to errors.   
 
In cases of violence, sentences are much closer to the recommended midpoint -- each additional 
recommended month increases sentences by 21.5 days.  Incorrectly long recommendations add 
to the sentence imposed, but at 12.6 days per month. Judges appear to discount these 
inaccuracies by about 50%.  Missing months in the recommendation are not discounted relative 
to the accurate midpoint – they decrease sentences by 21.7 days.  Not only are violent offenses 
half as prevalent as drug offenses, but the guidelines calculations are much more involved.  
There is an additional step required to include a series of case facts in the offense score.  There 
are also roughly twice as many total cells in the sentencing grid for violent offenses compared 
with drug offenses.  This may make it less likely that errors are “caught.”   
 
Unlike in drug cases, we can reject the null hypothesis that the impact of errors is symmetric.  




H    is less than one half of one percent.  One interpretation of this 
finding is that downstream actors are reluctant to honor recommended sentences that are “too 
long” and show more deference to guidelines when the recommended sentence is too low.   
 
Turning to property offenses, we find that sentences are similarly responsive to accurate 
recommendations as with drug offences (13 days for each month recommended), but that 
inaccuracies don’t have any appreciable impact.  We cannot reject the null hypothesis that 
discretion is unaffected by sentencing recommendations - neither 
S
H   or
S
L   is estimated to be 
statistically different from zero.  Although there are fewer single count property offenses than 
drug or violent offenses, this lack of statistical significance is unlikely to be the result of type-II 
error as there are still a large number of cases with recommendation errors.   
 
The estimated values of 
S
H   and 
S
L   for property offenses are also an order of magnitude smaller 
than
S
A  , and smaller than the corresponding estimates among drug and violent cases.  
                                                 
19  Note that our estimates of 
S
H   and
S
L  are statistically robust to the inclusion of these covariates, supporting our 
claim that the guidelines inaccuracies approximate random human error.   13
Technically, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that judges respond to accurate 




A     
is 12%), but this is due to the large standard errors on 
S
L  .  The lack of responsiveness to 
mistakes in the guidelines is consistent with our earlier learning hypothesis.  Circuit court judges 
in Maryland frequently have experience in lower (district) courts before their appointments to the 
circuit court.  In the lower courts, judges will have handled numerous property crime cases, 
which are a substantial fraction of the docket.
20 
  
Across specifications, we have found that plea bargains have shorter sentence lengths, on 
average.  This finding is consistent with defendants entering a guilty plea in exchange for a less 
costly punishment (Reinganum 1988), or the general idea of a trial penalty (Grossman and Katz 
1983).  It is also plausible that pled cases receive less attention from judges, making it plausible 
that they respond to sentencing recommendations in a fundamentally different way.      
 
In specifications reported in columns (4)-(6), we restrict the sample to those cases resolved by 
plea bargains. We find the drug sentences to be slightly less responsive to all of the 
recommendations – accurate and inaccurate – in pled cases.  Among the pled violent cases, we 
now observe symmetry in reaction to the inaccurate parts of the sentence recommendations- 
judges give slightly more deference to increases in recommendations, but less deference to lower 
recommendations.  Further, note that in pled cases, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that 
judges respond to accurate and inaccurate increases in recommendations equally, but can reject 
the null hypothesis that judges completely compensate for mistakenly low sentences with 95% 
certainty.  Conclusions for pled property offenses are the same as for the full sample, although, 
again, there is a weaker correlation between the accurate component of the recommendation and 
the judge’s decision.  
 
So far, the results indicate that guidelines do not influence sentence outcomes for property 
offenses.  But for the other offense types, inaccuracies have an impact on sentence outcomes, by 
less than a literal reading would suggest, more for violent offenses than for drug convictions, and 
among violent offenses, more for low errors than for high.  
 
VI. Falsification Test 
The above analysis relies on the assumption that the “facts of the case” (the offender and offense 
data) are accurate and that any deviation of the sentence recommendation from that indicated by 
the facts of the case is caused by human error.  This assumption would be false in a scenario in 
which attorneys agree on a recommended sentence and then record “facts of the case” to comport 
with the agreement.  Because we do not have independent information on the bargaining process 
between the two attorneys, we cannot directly test this assumption.  However, we can create a 
situation in which we incorrectly classify convictions as containing errors and compare our 
results to estimates from the falsified data.  If our falsified results are identical to our main result, 
this would cast doubt on our conclusion that internally inconsistent worksheets indicate simple 
human error.  
  
                                                 
20 We thank Eve Brensike Primus of the University of Michigan Law School for suggesting this interpretation.    14
From the sample of 15,338 cases in which the facts of the case and sentence recommendation 
were consistent, we randomly selected 877 of those cases to be “too low” and 875 cases to be 
“too high” to match the distribution of errors in the full sample.  We then divided the 
recommended sentences into multiple components, splitting the recommendation at an arbitrary 
break point for cases deemed “too high,” and adding an arbitrary fraction of the recommendation 
in cases that were “too low.”  As a result, in each of these cases the accurate sentence 
recommendation should be the sum of the “inconsistent” and “consistent” parts of the case.  We 
then re-estimated equation (1) with this sample.  Our estimated results are presented in Table 5.  
As expected, our estimates of the 
S
A   are very close to the previous estimates (from the first three 
columns in Table 4).  
 
Contrary to our primary results, in the falsification sample we cannot reject the null hypothesis 
that judges defer to punitive recommendations.  For all three offense types, we cannot reject (at 
the 5% level of statistical significance) the null hypothesis that sentences are as responsive to 
extra recommended months as they are to accurate or missing months.  Note also that there is no 
evidence of a strong inframarginality problem.  If the additional months added onto a worksheet 
for this exercise are interpreted as a spline of the recommended sentence, judges appear to 
respond equally to the first and last month of a recommendation. 
 
This falsification test promotes confidence in the results of the primary empirical approach.  And 
it argues against the plausibility of the interpretation that plea bargains lead to the errors in the 
guidelines values rather than the guidelines influencing the sentence outcomes.   
 
VII. Sentencing Guidelines and Time Served 
Even after the sentence is assigned, other downstream actions can influence the time actually 
served to fulfill that term.  Because the sentencing worksheet remains part of the individual’s 
criminal record, it is plausible that parole boards are also influenced by its contents.  In order to 
analyze the downstream behavior, we focus our analysis on the 8,184 sentences for which we 
have data on time served as well as sentence length.
21  
 
We now estimate a model of time served that is comparable to equation (1), with number of days 
incarcerated replacing sentence length as the dependant variable:  
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1,260 of the 8,184 convictions are right censored because the individuals were still incarcerated 
at the time of data collection.  Nonetheless, these incomplete spells still contain some 
information about the impact of worksheet inconsistencies on time served by placing a lower 
bound on the dependant variable.  The estimation procedure is split into two further steps - the 
effect of the independent variables on time served and the effect of the independent variables on 
whether or not the incarceration spell is completed; we are essentially treating time served as a 
                                                 
21  Time served information was collected from state prison system and jails in Baltimore City and the counties of 
Prince George, Anne Arundel, and Washington.  All cases that were dropped were cases with jail sentences, 
meaning sentences of one year or less.  Thus, the sample is composed disproportionately of more serious cases that 
resulted in prison sentences.   15
latent variable.  Let 
c
i Time be the observed time served.  The relationship between the actual 
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i Time  if the offender is released.  Let di equal one if the sentence is complete, and 
zero otherwise.  The likelihood function for equation (2) is therefore: 
(4)                     i
c
i i i i i i Time H d Time h d L , 1 ln 1 ) , ( ln ) (  
where Λi represents the values of the independent variables associated with period of 
incarceration i, h(•) is the probability density function evaluated at Timei, and H(•) is the 
cumulative density function evaluated at 
c
i Time . 
 
Due to their position as downstream actors, parole boards have more information about behavior 
and program participation while incarcerated in addition to the sentence recommendation and the 
imposed sentence.  There are two mechanisms through which the guidelines can impact parole 
boards: a direct effect of the sentence recommendation as well as an indirect effect through the 
sentence itself.  In order to estimate the relative importance of these two effects, we estimate 
equation (2) both with and without controlling for sentence length.   
 
Table 6 reports estimates of time served.
22 The odd numbered columns exclude sentence length 
on the right hand side, the even numbered columns include this variable.  Column (1) shows that 
for drug offenses each additional month suggested by the sentencing guidelines is associated 
with 5 additional days (s.e.=0.19) served by convicted offenders – many fewer days than 
suggested by looking at the sentences imposed.  Each additional month erroneously 
recommended increased time served by 3.09 days (s.e.=0.65).  Individuals receiving arbitrarily 
shorter recommendations were released only 1.7 days (s.e.=1.1) earlier than similar offenders 
who received accurate recommendations.  Further, once the impact of the errors on the judge’s 
sentence is taken into account, column (2), there is no remaining independent effect of the errors 
on time served.  Note, however, that each accurately recommended month does increase time 
served by one day (se=0.18), over and above its correlation with sentence length.       
 
In contrast to the drug offenses, for violent (columns 3 and 4) and property (columns 5 and 6) 
convictions we cannot reject the null hypothesis that errors in the worksheet completion process 
do not impact the amount of time an offender is incarcerated.  Conditional on sentence length, 
we find no additional correlation between what the legislature recommends and what parole 
                                                 
22 Because the time served sample is a subsample of the analysis sample for Table 4, we examined the determinants 
of sentence length using the new subsample and found qualitatively identical results Specifically, in this sample of 
drug cases, each recommended month is associated with a sentence of 11 days (se=0.4), each arbitrarily added 
month worth 7 days (se=1), and each arbitrarily missing month reduces sentence by 5 days (se=2).  For violent 
offenses, the corresponding relationships are 19 days (se=1), 17 days (se=5), and 20 days (se=6).  Finally, for the 
sub-sample of property offenses, we observe that each recommended month is associated with a 10 day sentence 
(se=0.8), each arbitrarily added month worth 4 days (se=3) and each arbitrarily missing month increases sentences 
by an imprecise 2 days (se=7).     16
boards do. We conclude that parole boards rely heavily on information specific to the offender 
and offense in question for these types of offenses.     
 
Are parole boards “undoing” errors made prior to the sentencing decision?  Note that in violent 
offenses, the sign of our estimates of 
S
H   and 
S
L    flip when we include sentence length.  While 
not statistically significant, the magnitudes are non-trivial (3 days for each month) and suggests 
that the direct impact of arbitrarily missing or added months on time served counteracts the 
indirect impact.  While far from conclusive, this suggests that downstream actors may, in part, be 
responding to the decision of upstream actors in a strategic way.    
 
VIII. Robustness 
We further investigate the nature of the relationship between guidelines and sentencing by 
allowing the impact of the inaccurate component of the sentence recommendation to vary across 
different dimensions.  If large discrepancies in recommendations are more likely to be identified 
as errors, we would expect to see a diminishing marginal impact of the inaccuracies as they 
increase in absolute size.  We would also expect that sentences for common offenses should be 
less sensitive to inaccuracies.  We also address concerns that worksheet inaccuracies are the 
result of unobserved racial bias in the sentencing process by allowing the impact of 
recommendations to vary by race.  We then allow the impact of the error to vary with the 
frequency with which the court sees similar cases.  Finally, we adapt our empirical strategy to 
take the non-normal distribution of sentence length into account, by modeling sentence length as 
a count variable with excess zeros. 
  
Tables 7a – 8c report the results from these alternate specifications. The sign of the squared 
values of 
S
H  is the opposite of the sign of linear parameter for drug and property offenses, 
implying a diminishing marginal impact of arbitrarily added months (but the effect of this is 
small).  On the other hand, note that the estimated impact of the squared value of 
S
L  is negative, 
and when the quadratic effect is included we are no longer able to precisely estimate the linear 
relationship between missing months and sentence length.  This interesting result suggests that 
judges become more sensitive to lower recommendations as the number of “missing” months 
increases.  
 
We do not find evidence that the impact of guidelines recommendations is heterogeneous with 
respect to race (column 2).  As expected, the interaction between similar convictions and 
inaccurate recommendations that are too low is opposite in sign to the first order effect of the 
recommendation, although not precisely estimated.  There appears to be no evidence of any 
“learning” when recommendations are too high – the coefficient is an order of magnitude smaller 
than the standard error.  This provides mixed support for the learning interpretation.   
 
Finally, our general conclusions are robust to our statistical modeling assumptions.  Estimating 
the relationship between sentence length and recommendation using a zero-inflated negative 
binomial also finds positive and significant effects of additional months on the worksheet and 
negative and statistically significant effects of inaccuracy in the opposite direction, with 
responsiveness to legislative reductions being larger than responses to increases for violent 
offenses.  Note that since these coefficients are roughly partial elasticities, the size of the   17
coefficients are not directly comparable- a 1% increase in accurately recommended sentence is 
much larger than a 1% increase in a mistake.   
 
Table 8 reports a similar set of tests using time served as the dependant variable.  The substantive 
results are quite consistent across these specifications.  We find evidence of a diminishing 
marginal impact of arbitrarily added or missing recommended months, and no statistically 
significant difference between the treatment of black and non-black males.  One way in which 
the results vary from the previous estimates is in regard to our proxy for judicial learning.  
Instead of having a limiting effect on the inconsistent recommendations we find amplifying 
effects.  While puzzling, our proxy is better suited to the sentencing decision, as it is based on the 
number of similar convictions occurring in the county.  The analogous proxy would be the 
number of similar cases seen by the given parole board in that year, and we do not have access to 
the necessary data to construct this measure.  
 
As with sentence length, the qualitative findings are robust to alternate statistical models, 
including the linear probability model and the censored negative binomial.  Restricting the 




In this paper, we take advantage a new source of identification to study how government actors 
interact and make decisions in the criminal sentencing process.  Our use of miscalculations in 
recommended sentences gives a window into the complex process of criminal sentencing that 
has implications for how we expect the imposition of government regulations to influence policy 
outcomes.  Under the assumption that mistakes in the guidelines recommendation occur at 
random the resulting variation in recommended sentences is uncorrelated with a judge’s 
preferences for punishment in a given case.     
 
Because we observe both the accurate and inaccurate worksheet recommendation, we are able to 
explicitly quantify the extent to which downstream actors have preferences that differ from those 
of the upstream actors.  The use of mistakes in guidelines calculations, rather than changes in 
guidelines due to policy changes, allows us to estimate the interaction among actors without 
requiring the existence of any new policy or explicit change in preferences.   
 
We find that even an advisory guideline system like the one in Maryland has a direct impact on 
judicial decision making in drug and violent cases.  In a state where almost half of the sentences 
are below the recommended minimum, judges still appear eager to go along with a lesser 
sentence in violent offenses.  Relative to the underlying correlation between legislative 
guidelines and judicial decision making, judges appear to reduce their sentences one for one with 
arbitrarily reduced recommendations.  If recommended sentences are too high, judges appear to 
discount the mistakes, but are still influenced by what are, by definition, recommendations that 
are orthogonal to the case at hand.       
 
                                                 
23  We also estimate models (results available on request) in which the additional months are interacted with the job 
title of the individual completing the worksheet, which would allow us to learn if mistakes made by certain types of 
individuals are more likely to be detected.  We find no compelling evidence that this is the case.    18
This asymmetry does not occur in the simpler, more frequent, and arguably lower social cost 
crime types of property and drug offenses.  Rather, it is among the more complicated and less 
frequent offenses of personal violence that guidelines recommendations are more binding and the 
response to inaccuracy more asymmetric.  More generally, we find that experience matters.  
Error rates are lower for more frequently occurring offense types and lower for those court 
professionals who complete more of the sentencing worksheets. 
 
The net effect of sentencing guidelines on time served appears to be small because of conflicting 
preferences within the criminal justice system.  Parole boards appear largely unconstrained by 
the guidelines.  In addition, they appear to prefer longer sentences and therefore counteract the 
errors which result in leniency.  It is also possible that parole boards have different, more 
proximal information that is systematically less optimistic than the information available to the 
upstream actors.   
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Table 1.  Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition  Temporal  Location 
Accurate Midpoint  Mean of upper and lower 
range of sentencing 
guidelines as calculated by 
algorithm.  (see fig. 1 “CJIS 
Code”, “Offender Score” 
and “Offense Score”  
 
“Upstream” prior to judge and 
parole board decision 
Worksheet Midpoint  Mean of upper and lower 
range of sentencing 
guidelines as entered on 
worksheet. (see fig. 1 
“Guidelines Range”)      
 
“Upstream” prior to judge and 
parole board decision 
Nature of Representation  Legal representation of 
offender (see fig. 1 
“Representation”) 
 
“Upstream” prior to judge and 
parole board decision 
Plea Bargain  Outcome determined prior 
to trial (see fig. 1 
“Disposition Type”) 
 
“Upstream” prior to judge and 
parole board decision 
Race   Race of Offender (see fig. 1 
“Race” 
 
“Upstream” prior to judge and 
parole board decision 
Age  Age of offender at 
sentencing (see fig. 1 “Birth 
Date”, “Date of 
Sentencing”) 
 
“Upstream” prior to judge and 
parole board decision 
Worksheet Completer  Individual responsible for 
filling out worksheet given 
to judge (see fig. 1 “Title”) 
 
“Upstream” prior to judge and 
parole board decision 
Sentence  Sentence determined by 
Judge (see fig. 1 “Actual 
Sentence”) 
 
“Downstream” prior to parole 
board decision 
Time Served  Number of days (if 
observed to be incarcerated) 
 
“Downstream”   
 
Table 2: “Upstream” Characteristics of Accurate and Inaccurate Worksheets 
 Offense  Type 
  All Drug  Violent  Property 
Sample Size          
                                             Accurate  15,338   8,747  4,404  2,187 
High  936   757  94  85 
Low  778 479  132  167 
Worksheet Midpoint, in months       
























Accurate Midpoint, in months        
























% Private Representation        
























% Plea Bargain        
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Statistically different from consistent worksheets at * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% significance level 
Standard deviation in parentheses, standard errors in braces. 
 
Table 3: Predicting Worksheet Errors.  Marginal Effects from Logit Estimation  
  DV: Worksheet is Inaccurate  DV: Worksheet is Too High  DV: Worksheet is Too Low 
   Drug  Violent  Property   Drug  Violent Property    Drug  Violent Property 
Accurate Midpoint 
(divided by 1000) 
-0.015 -0.015 0.294  -0.045 -0.205*  -1.216***  0.052  0.052 0.548*** 
[0.076] [0.054] [0.207] [0.078] [0.081] [0.336] [0.120] [0.033] [0.144] 
Similar Cases   -0.312*** -0.318  -2.053* -0.318*** 0.173  -0.947 -0.059*** -0.570  -1.55* 
[0.014] [0.671] [0.849] [0.005] [0.365] [0.854] [0.008] [0.491] [0.655] 
Plea Bargain   0.015 0.010 0.022  0.024***  0.002 0.011 -0.006 0.008 0.019 
[0.011] [0.012] [0.015] [0.007] [0.008] [0.017] [0.007] [0.011] [0.010] 
Black   -0.007 0.009 -0.020  -0.016* 0.003 -0.014* 0.006  0.008  -0.001 
[0.006] [0.007] [0.020] [0.007] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.007] [0.015] 
Private Representation  0.011 0.002  -0.020 0.007 -0.012* -0.012  0.006  0.009  -0.014 
[0.008] [0.008] [0.020] [0.005] [0.006] [0.022] [0.006] [0.007] [0.020] 
Worksheet Completed 
by State’s Attorney 
0.029 0.013 0.025 0.007 0.011 0.012 0.030 0.007 0.020 
[0.033] [0.026] [0.057] [0.024] [0.017] [0.022] [0.016] [0.022] [0.052] 
Worksheet Completed 
by Public Defender 
0.059* 0.014 0.046 0.037* 0.007  0.018 0.035* 0.007  0.040 
[0.024] [0.022] [0.040] [0.018] [0.011] [0.016] [0.013] [0.018] [0.036] 
Worksheet Completed 
by Private Attorney 
0.100* 0.054 0.055  0.057 0.056  0.162***  0.065**  -0.003  -0.014 
[0.040] [0.061] [0.055] [0.035] [0.036] [0.038] [0.025] [0.040] [0.034] 
Pseudo R
2  0.06 0.07 0.09 0.15 0.11 0.16 0.05 0.06 0.08 
N 9,979  3,272  1,842  9,427 2,486 1,314 9,153 3,080 1,712 
Error Rate in Logit 
Sample  12.4% 6.9% 13.6% 8.03% 3.78% 6.47% 5.23% 4.28% 9.70% 
Error Rate in Full 
Sample  12.4% 4.88% 10.3% 7.58% 2.09% 3.74% 4.80% 2.91% 7.09% 
Notes:  Age at sentencing, jurisdictions, six month fixed effects controls included. Standard errors in brackets allow for arbitrary correlation  
within jurisdiction.  56% of worksheets were completed by a State’s attorney, 3.2% by a public defender, and 2.6% by a private attorney. 
*  = p < 5%, **  = p <1%, ***  = p <0.1% 
 
Table 4: OLS Estimates, Dependant Variable: Sentence Length (in days) 
 Offense  Type Pleas  Only 















A  ) 
11.8*** 21.5*** 13.0*** 11.1*** 17.7*** 11.7*** 
[2.46] [1.55] [0.91] [2.06] [1.80] [1.46] 
Additional months on 
Worksheet (
S
H  ) 
6.06***  12.6*** 0.46 4.32***  14.2*** -0.6 
[0.96] [2.46] [1.29] [1.02] [2.48] [2.11] 




L  ) 
-6.71* -21.7*** -2.1  -6.52  -13.9***  -4.13 
[3.14] [1.21] [6.29] [3.22] [1.76] [6.51] 
Plea Bargain 
-42.6 -190** -63.8  --  --  -- 
[26.3] [59.2] [38.5]       
Private 
Representation 
-7.28 -110***  -38  -28.8 -100.4** -62.6 
[14.2] [23.7] [24.8] [24.3] [26.7] [42.6] 
R
2  0.41  0.63  0.45 0.4 0.53  0.41 
N  9983 4630 2439 7396 3070 1647 
Mean Sentence 
Length  528.8 958.8 440.1 488.6 816.6 395.8 
P-value of F-stat        
P(
S
A  = 
S
H  )  0.0038 0.02 0.0000  0.0002 0.41 0.0001 
P(
S
A  = 
S
L  )  0.0022 0.90  0.12 0.0067  0.042  0.34 
P(
S
H  = 
S
L  )  0.80  0.0037  0.80 0.39 0.95 0.49 
Notes: Jurisdiction, six month dummy variables included, as well as age at sentence, number of similar cases, race of offender, and title of the 
person completing the worksheet.  Standard errors in brackets allow for arbitrary correlation within jurisdiction. 
*  = p < 5%, **  = p <1%, ***  = p <0.1% 
  
 









A  ) 
 
11.7*** 21.4*** 12.7*** 
[2.51] [1.49] [1.02] 
Additional months on 
Worksheet (
S
H  ) 
13.9*** 25.0**  29.9 
[1.37] [8.65] [25.9] 
Missing months on 
Worksheet (-
S
H  ) 
-8.34* -14.2**  -24.2** 
[3.66] [5.04] [7.98] 
Plea Bargain  -22.8 -205.6** -62.6 
[19.7] [62.8] [41.5] 
Private Representation  -4.25 -126.4*** -47.9 
[17.5] [30.4] [28.6] 
R
2  0.41 0.62 0.43 
N  8747 4404 2187 
P-value of F-stat     
P(
S
A  = 
S
H  )  0.23 0.66 0.52 
P(
S
A  = 
S





H  )  0.078 0.30  0.84 
Notes:   Jurisdiction, six month, plea bargain, private representation and dummy variables included, as well as age at sentence, number of similar cases, race of 
offender, and title of individual completing the worksheet.  Column 1 includes offense type dummy variables.  Standard errors in brackets allow for 
arbitrary correlation within jurisdiction. 
*  = p < 5%, **  = p <1%, ***  = p <0.1%    
 
Table 6: MLE Estimates, Dependent Variable: Time Served (in days) 
 Drug Violent Property 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Accurate Midpoint  
(
S




























































Sentence Length    10.3*** 
(0.51)    10.2*** 
(0.46)    12.4*** 
(1.19) 
R
2  0.38 0.58 0.40 0.41 0.52 0.63 
N  5230 5230 2134 2134  820  820 
Mean of DV  297.0 297.0 545.5 545.5 354.9 354.9 
P-value of F-stat        
P(
S
A  = 
S
H  )  0.014 0.80 0.017 0.18 0.053 0.38 
P(
S
A  = 
S
L  )  0.0046  0.26 0.14 0.11 0.58 0.36 
P(
S
H  = 
S
L  )  0.28 0.41 0.72 0.93 0.52 0.26 
Notes: Jurisdiction, six month and private representation dummy variables included, as well as age at sentence, number of similar cases, race of 
offender, and title of the person completing the worksheet.  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*  = p < 5%, **  = p <1%, ***  = p <0.1%  
 
















A  ) 
 
11.9*** 11.8*** 11.8***  0.004***  0.021*** 
[2.48] [2.47] [2.45]  [0.0005]  [0.002] 
Additional months on 
Worksheet (
S
H  ) 
12.0* 8.73*  6.29***  0.002***  0.0048* 
[4.54] [3.95] [1.34]  [0.00007]  [0.0019] 
(Additional months on 
Worksheet)
2  
-0.057      
[0.036]      
(Additional months on 
Worksheet) x Black 
  -2.94     
 [3.53]      
(Additional months on 
Worksheet) x Similar 
Cases 
   -1.47    
   [2.90]    
Missing months on 
Worksheet (-
S
L  ) 
-4.21 -5.82 -6.36  -0.0001  -0.0075*** 
[3.11] [7.08] [4.05]  [0.0006]  [0.0022] 
(Missing months on 
Worksheet)
2 
-0.033      
[0.021]      
(Missing months on 
Worksheet) x Black 
  -1.03     
 [5.78]      
(Missing months on 
Worksheet) x Similar 
Cases 
   -1.11    
   [2.89]    
R
2  0.41 0.41 0.41 0.19 0.40 
N  9983 9983 9983 9977 5542 
Mean of D.V.  528.7  528.7  528.7  0.55  951.8 
Notes:  Jurisdiction, six month, plea bargain, private representation and dummy variables included, as well as age at sentence, 
number of similar cases, race of offender, and title of individual completing the worksheet.  Standard errors in brackets allow for 
arbitrary correlation within jurisdiction. 
*  = p < 5%, **  = p <1%, ***  = p <0.1%    
 















A  ) 
 
21.5*** 21.5*** 21.5***  0.0047***  0.010*** 
[1.56] [1.55] [1.55]  [0.0007]  [0.001] 
Additional months on 
Worksheet (
S
H  ) 
7.94 15.2  14.4***  0.004***  0.0015 
[7.40] [13.7] [2.64]  [0.001]  [0.002] 
(Additional months on 
Worksheet)
2  
0.039      
[0.050]      
(Additional months on 
Worksheet) x Black 
  -2.79     
 [15.0]      
(Additional months on 
Worksheet) x Similar 
Cases 
   -303.1    
   [193.9]    
Missing months on 
Worksheet (-
S
L  ) 
-17.5*** -30.2*** -17.8***  -0.004***  -0.008*** 
[3.16] [3.81] [2.37]  [0.0004]  [0.0013] 
(Missing months on 
Worksheet)
2 
-0.032      
[0.018]      
(Missing months on 
Worksheet) x Black 
  9.40*     
 [3.46]      
(Missing months on 
Worksheet) x Similar 
Cases 
   -301.6*    
   [119.7]    
R
2  0.63 0.63 0.63 0.21 0.60 
N  4630 4630 4630 4595 3217 
Mean  of  D.V.  958.8 958.8 958.8 0.692 1,382 
Notes:  Jurisdiction, six month, plea bargain, private representation and dummy variables included, as well as age at sentence, number of similar 
cases, race of offender, and title of individual completing the worksheet.  Standard errors in brackets allow for arbitrary correlation within 
jurisdiction. 
*  = p < 5%, **  = p <1%, ***  = p <0.1%   
  
 















A  ) 
 
13.0*** 13.0*** 12.9***  0.006***  0.015*** 
[0.90] [0.91] [0.86]  [0.0008]  [0.001] 
Additional months on 
Worksheet (
S
H  ) 
1.96 0.53 0.44  0.001  0.0012 
[4.20] [1.29] [3.83]  [0.002]  [0.002] 
(Additional months on 
Worksheet)
2  
-0.008      
[0.016]      
(Additional months on 
Worksheet) x Black 
  -0.56     
 [2.26]      
(Additional months on 
Worksheet) x Similar 
Cases 
   0.6    
   [255.3]    
Missing months on 
Worksheet (-
S
L  ) 
-1.76 -1.07 -7.76  -0.002  -0.01* 
[8.29] [8.39] [4.82]  [0.003]  [0.0048] 
(Missing months on 
Worksheet)
2 
-0.0065      
[0.26]      
(Missing months on 
Worksheet) x Black 
  -3.43     
 [9.13]      
(Missing months on 
Worksheet) x Similar 
Cases 
   548.4    
   [419.9]    
R
2  0.45 0.45 0.45 0.18 0.43 
N  2439 2439 2439 2435 1507 
Mean  of  D.V.  440.1 440.1 440.1 0.612 712.9 
Notes:  Jurisdiction, six month, plea bargain, private representation and dummy variables included, as well as age at sentence, number of similar 
cases, race of offender, and title of individual completing the worksheet.  Standard errors in brackets allow for arbitrary correlation within 
jurisdiction. 
*  = p < 5%, **  = p <1%, ***  = p <0.1%   
  
 












A  ) 
 
4.79*** 4.79*** 4.79***  0.005***  0.0047***  2.67*** 
(0.19) (0.19) (0.19)  (0.0002)  (0.00050)  (0.13) 
Additional months on 
Worksheet (
T
H  ) 
5.60*** 5.47* 2.63***  0.003***  0.00095***  1.65** 
(1.17) (2.28) (0.74)  (0.0002)  (0.00023)  (0.51) 
(Additional months on 
Worksheet)
2  
-0.023*       
(0.0091)       
(Additional months on 
Worksheet) x Black 
  -2.58      
 (2.38)        
(Additional months on 
Worksheet) x Similar 
Cases 
   3.22     
   (1.99)     
Missing months on 
Worksheet (-
T
L  ) 
-1.22 4.3 -0.97  -0.0003  -0.001  -0.11 
(2.09) (5.55) (1.51)  (0.001)  (0.0011)  (0.82) 
(Missing months on 
Worksheet)
2 
-0.006       
(0.021)       
(Missing months on 
Worksheet) x Black 
  -6.42      
 (5.66)        
(Missing months on 
Worksheet) x Similar 
Cases 
   -1.94      
   (2.34)     
R
2  0.38 0.38 0.38 0.21 0.18 0.35 
N  5230 5230 5230 4741 2931 4644 
Mean  of  D.V.  297.0 297.0 297.0 0.515 530.0 190.1 
Notes: Jurisdiction, six month, plea bargain, offense type, private representation and dummy variables included, as well as age at sentence, 
number of similar cases, race of offender, and title of individual completing the worksheet.  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
















A  ) 
 
5.32*** 5.32*** 5.32***  0.004***  0.0041***  2.03*** 
(1.22) (1.22) (1.22)  (0.0003)  (0.00053)  (0.30) 
Additional months on 
Worksheet (
T
H  ) 
0.44 6.21 -0.77  0.004  -0.0022  1.72 
(3.90) (9.01) (1.82)  (0.002)  (0.0019)  (1.87) 
(Additional months on 
Worksheet)
2  
-0.0034       
(0.026)       
(Additional months on 
Worksheet) x Black 
  -6.58      
 (9.16)        
(Additional months on 
Worksheet) x Similar 
Cases 
   129.3      
   (196.7)     
Missing months on 
Worksheet (-
T
L  ) 
-2.77 -3.56  1.32 -0.002  0.0075 -1.9 
(5.20) (5.22) (3.78)  (0.001)  (0.0062)  (1.60) 
(Missing months on 
Worksheet)
2 
0.017       
(0.042)       
(Missing months on 
Worksheet) x Black 
 2.5        
 (5.89)        
(Missing months on 
Worksheet) x Similar 
Cases 
   -343.2*     
   (171.7)     
R
2  0.40 0.40 0.40 0.22 0.11 0.41 
N  2134 2134 2134 1574 1624 1577 
Mean  of  D.V.  545.5 545.5 545.5 0.676 716.8 305.2 
Notes: Jurisdiction, six month, plea bargain, offense type, private representation and dummy variables included, as well as age at sentence, 
number of similar cases, race of offender, and title of individual completing the worksheet.  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*  = p < 5%, **  = p <1%, ***  = p <0.1%   
  
 












A  ) 
 
5.04*** 4.99*** 5.05***  0.005  0.015***  2.84*** 
(0.55) (0.55) (0.54)  (0.002)  (0.0015)  (0.43) 
Additional months on 
Worksheet (
T
H  ) 
4.26 1.51 -2.49  0.003  0.0091  1.29 
(5.76) (2.17) (3.26)  (0.004)  (0.0095)  (1.68) 
(Additional months on 
Worksheet)
2  
-0.046       
(0.075)       
(Additional months on 
Worksheet) x Black 
  -0.098      
 (3.76)        
(Additional months on 
Worksheet) x Similar 
Cases 
   395.4      
   (238.0)     
Missing months on 
Worksheet (-
T
L  ) 
-10.3 -5.59* -1.57 -0.001  -0.028***  -2.34 
(6.41) (2.76) (3.40)  (0.003)  (0.0058)  (1.89) 
(Missing months on 
Worksheet)
2 
0.14       
(0.12)       
(Missing months on 
Worksheet) x Black 
 14.2        
 (8.53)        
(Missing months on 
Worksheet) x Similar 
Cases 
   -163.7      
   (117.8)     
R
2  0.52 0.52 0.52 0.26 0.10 0.56 
N  820 820 820 568 582 703 
Mean  of  D.V.  354.9 354.9 354.9 0.581 500.1 226.3 
Jurisdiction, six month, plea bargain, offense type, private representation and dummy variables included, as well as age at sentence, number of 
similar cases, race of offender, and title of individual completing the worksheet.  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*  = p < 5%, **  = p <1%, ***  = p <0.1%   
 